Putin's war at home

is going as poorly as the war in Ukraine

Repression by government, official or unofficial, against populist revolts, no matter how small, is bad political messaging.

Totalitarian regimes don’t care; but even in such nations, the act of giving a public speech to have the “will of the state” explained and imposed is a sign of political failure. If you have to sell the party line, you’ve failed as an autocrat.

And so it is with Vladimir Putin and his war in Ukraine. The war, which began in 2014, went from simmer to boil in February and has been roiling ever since. Putin’s military losses of late and the lack of popular support within the military ranks for his war has led to several desperate measures on Putin’s part, including a mass mobilization of troops going forward.

That mass mobilization, expected to be about 300,000 men, was outlined in a nationally televised speech by Putin on September 21st. The speech, unfortunately for Putin, confirmed what most foreign policy experts already surmised — Putin’s problems at home are worse than his military’s situation in Ukraine.¹

In announcing the mobilization “[P]utin has sought to remedy the chronic shortage in manpower by mobilizing a very broad category of men, whatever their actual military experience and professional roles. The starting goal is 300,000 extra troops, although the eventual number could be much higher. Rushing them into service without proper kit (winter is coming), equipment, training, and officers capable of leading them risks carnage in battle and a backlash at home. Meanwhile, Putin’s decree also prevents those already on the frontline on short-term contracts from leaving. This could further worsen the morale and discipline issues that have plagued the Russian side from the start.”²

Professor Lawrence Freedman of King’s College, who wrote the above for Foreign Affairs last month, delineates three reasons: miscalculating Ukrainian resolve, overestimating the economic leverage Russia had with its oil and gas for Europe, and a key military misplay moving the bulk of Russia’s troops to the Donbas region after failing to take Kviv.

Professor Freedman’s analysis follows similar realist viewpoints: Vladimir Putin has made a tremendous miscalculation that may lead to political challenges within Russia’s oligarchy — a problem that existed at the tail of the Soviet system³ and that persists today. Putin’s political hold over Russia requires a degree of economic confidence that Putin cannot imprison or assassinate.

In announcing the annexation of a vast region of Ukraine, Putin has effectively doubled down on what has been a military failure. With a troubled economy at home and political grumbling over his war becoming more vocal and more open, Putin’s oligarchy may choose political change rather than endure more economic losses.

1. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/putin-speech-delay-ukraine-world-leaders/671495/

2. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/all-tsars-men?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20221001

3. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-21/can-putin-survive